Mechanisms of conflict and dispute resolution in Ancient Near Eastern Treaties by Pfeifer, Guido
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOEWE-SCHWERPUNKT 
„Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung“ 
 
 
LOEWE Research Focus  
"Extrajudicial and Judicial Conflict Resolution" 
 
 
Arbeitspapier/Working Paper 
 
Nr. 9 (2013) 
 
 
Mechanisms of Conflict and Dispute Resolution  
in Ancient Near Eastern Treaties  
 
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-321015 
 
Guido Pfeifer 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Guido Pfeifer  
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
Institut für Rechtsgeschichte 
Lehrstuhl für Antike Rechtsgeschichte, Europäische Privatrechtsgeschichte und Zivilrecht 
 
pfeifer@jur.uni-frankfurt.de 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 by the author 2 
 
I. Introduction
1 
The juridical classification and evaluation of the texts which here are unbiasedly and undis-
cerningly called “treaties”
2 and which are bequeathed from the Ancient Near East from the 
first three millennia BCE have caused some trouble in the past and the discussion has not 
come to a definite result yet. The difficulties derive on one hand from the fact that often par-
ticular juridical aspects of the texts and their content are combined with the more general 
question of the existence or non-existence of an Ancient Near Eastern International Law
3. 
Similar to the question of the actual function and application of Ancient Near Eastern law 
collections this problem has been discussed widely and controversially
4. We will come back 
to that topic later. Another reason for the problems that follow a legal perspective on the trea-
ties, again similar to the law collections, is the fact that we miss a meta-level of contemporary 
theoretical reflection on treaties and their context which goes beyond the texts as such, as it 
is at least partially the fact with ancient Greece and Rome
5. Finally, additional difficulties de-
rive from details of the texts and their content and tradition. 
Looking for a possibility to get around the foresaid difficulties of an all juridical access to the 
sources one could attend a terminological and phenomenological detour and sample an al-
ternative categorization. For that purpose the term “mechanisms of conflict resolution” seems 
suitable, because it includes the juridical instruments of conflict resolution, but at the same 
time opens up a much wider spectrum of political and social actions, from sheer violence to 
all possible forms of negotiations including their breakdown up to procedural decisions of 
juridical nature or other. The effort of an alternative description of the treaties might provide a 
more adequate outline of the specific juridical aspects than the usual perspective of legal 
history does. A detailed analysis of individual texts cannot be offered in this place, as it will 
have to be done in the form of a textual commentary in the framework of a re-edition of sev-
eral treaties in Akkadian language
6. Instead this article will focus on the methodological and 
terminological background of a future commentary and aims to put it up for discussion. At the 
same time the examples from the quoted sources might be representative only to a limited 
extent and also some anachronisms might be unavoidable. 
In the following we will shortly comment on the question of an Ancient Near Eastern Interna-
tional Law, then continue with the function of treaties as mechanisms of conflict resolution as 
such and finally take a look at peculiar contents of treaties which can be understood as 
mechanisms of conflict resolution. 
 
                                                           
1  The article is based on a paper given at the conference “Under the Aegis of 1000 Gods… The Egyptian-Hittite 
Relations during the Late Bronze Age” in Prague, April 19, 2013. A German version based on a paper given at 
the conference “Staatsverträge des Alten Vorderasien. Überlieferung – Funktion – Rechtshistorische Perspekti-
ven” in Frankfurt am Main, September 10-12, 2012 will be published in Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Bibli-
sche Rechtsgeschichte (ZAR), vol. 19, 2013 (in print). 
2  For this use of the terminology and its problematic aspects cf. Michael Stolleis, Staatsverträge in der neueren 
Staats- und Völkerrechtsgeschichte, in: ZAR 19, 2013 (in print). 
3  On the application of the term “International Law” in the context of the Ancient Near East see Hans Neumann, 
s.v. „Staatsvertrag, II. Alter Orient“, in: Hubert Cancik/Helmuth Schneider (ed.), Der Neue Pauly 11, Stutt-
gart/Weimar 2001 (879-880) 879. 
4  For an overview see Amnon Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law. The Ancient 
Near East (2500-330 BCE), Leiden/Boston 2012, xxi-xxvi. 
5  For the law collections see Guido Pfeifer, Vom Wissen und Schaffen des Rechts im Alten Orient, 
Rechtsgeschichte (Rg) 19, 2011, 263-266. 
6  This re-edition project is prepared by the author together with Hans Neumann und Susanne Paulus in the 
framework of the series “Staatsverträge des Altertums” which is published by the Commission for Ancient Histo-
ry and Epigraphy of the German Archaeological Institute (DAI). 3 
 
II. Ancient Near Eastern International Law? 
Especially early modern period historians are rather skeptic towards the existence of an In-
ternational Law in antiquity, including the Ancient Near East. Essential part of the criticism is 
the reproval of an anachronistic conception, since the formation of states in a modern sense 
is more or less categorically denied for the ancient world
7. In fact, there are no specific terms 
in the Ancient Near Eastern languages, which could be compared e.g. to the Roman concep-
tion of ius gentium
8. The challenge resulting from this reproval could also refer to Benno 
Landsberger’s idea of an “Eigenbegrifflichkeit der babylonischen Welt”
9 which aims towards 
an even more fundamental dimension
10. But this would require an examination of its own. 
A rather pragmatical base could be found in a general conception of an ancient International 
Law, as offered by Eckart Otto referring to Wolfgang Preiser and Karl-Heinz Ziegler. He 
defines ancient International Law as “rechtlich verbindliche Ordnung verschiedener unab-
hängiger, sich gegenseitig als im Prinzip gleichberechtigt anerkennender und durch einen 
rechtlich geregelten Austausch politischer, kultureller und wirtschaftlicher Art verbundener 
Staaten”
11. Such a definition aims towards the analogy of phenomena from Ancient Near 
Eastern texts to institutions of modern international Law, without ignoring the peculiarities of 
ancient sources. As Amnon Altman has shown the Ancient Near Eastern tradition provides a 
vast number of material for accordant efforts of analogy, but also for an unbiased analysis
12. 
However, the critical point, especially for the legal historian, lies in the phrases “rechtlich 
verbindlich” (i.e. legally binding) and “rechtlich geregelt” (i.e. legally regulated). Besides the 
risk of a tautology (“Ancient International Law is International Law, because it is International 
Law”) it is precisely the legal character of treaties which is challenged again and again. One 
main argument in this context is that treaties are immensely charged with religious contents, 
especially with the typical metaphysical sanctions such as contingent self-execration in the 
context of oaths
13. David J. Bederman has indeed tried to modify this impression in favor of 
political rationalism and social sanctions as the fundament of an ancient International Law
14. 
But that leaves the question of a specific legal character of the treaties and in the end the 
question of the existence of an Ancient Near Eastern International Law still unanswered. The 
mere assertion of a small, but significant legal basis of the diplomatic, political and economic 
relationships of the nations of the Ancient Near East, as postulated by Otto and Bederman, 
do not seem to provide a sufficient explanation. 
                                                           
7  See Eckart Otto, Völkerrecht in der Hebräischen Bibel und seine altorientalischen Wurzeln, ZAR 12, 2006 (29-
51) 29 f. with further literature; Karl-Heinz Ziegler, Völkerrecht in den antiken Welten, in: Martin Lang/Heinz 
Barta/Robert Rollinger (ed.), Staatsverträge, Völkerrecht und Diplomatie im alten Orient und in der griechisch-
römischen Antike, Wiesbaden 2010 (27-38) 29. 
8  Essentially on this Max Kaser, Ius Gentium, Köln 1993. 
9  Benno Landsberger, Die Eigenbegrifflichkeit der babylonischen Welt, Islamica 2, 1926, 355-372 (reprint with 
afterword Darmstadt 1965, 2. Aufl. 1974). 
10 See Walther Sallaberger, Benno Landsbergers „Eigenbegrifflichkeit“ in wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Perspekti-
ve, in: Claus Wilcke (ed.), Das geistige Erfassen der Welt im Alten Orient. Sprache, Religion Kultur und Gesell-
schaft, Wiesbaden 2007 ( 63-82) 64-66. 
11 Otto, Völkerrecht in der Hebräischen Bibel, ZAR 12, 2006 (29-51) 29. 
12 A compilation of his articles published in the Journal of the History of International Law from 2004 to 2010 now 
in Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law. 
13 For the Hittite treaties still significant Viktor Korošec, Hethitische Staatsverträge. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer juristi-
schen Wertung, Leipzig 1931, 92-100; on that also H. Neumann, Zur rechtsgeschichtlichen und sozialpoliti-
schen Bedeutung der hethitischen Staatsverträge aus dem 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr., in: Lang/Barta/Rollinger 
(ed.), Staatsverträge (141-155) 148. On the problem for antiquity in general Eckart Otto, Völkerrecht in der Anti-
ke, ZAR 9, 2003, 201-209. 
14 David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, Cambridge 2002, esp. 50; on that also Otto, Völkerrecht in 
der Antike, ZAR 9, 2003 (201-209) 208. 4 
 
III. Treaties as mechanisms of conflict resolution 
1. (Provisional) termination and prevention of future conflicts 
Treaties – on a basis of parity or as vassal or subordination treaties – may be understood as 
mechanisms of conflict resolution (or with even more caution: of conflict accomplishment), 
when they follow and are meant to pacify an actual conflict between the parties, e.g. a war
15. 
At the same time their conception of an – in most cases – unlimited validity implies the pur-
pose to prevent future conflicts between the parties
16. 
2. Procedural context of treaties 
The functions of conflict resolution and conflict prevention belong at the same time to a wider 
procedural context of actions, often in ritualized forms, which precede treaties. Among them 
count e.g. declarations of war for which we have examples from the early dynastic period, 
rules and modalities of conduct of war, but also rules and modalities of diplomatic negotia-
tions
17. Quite often treaties remark but a transitional phase in the procedural sequence of 
conflicts, because conflicts are only temporarily settled and are revived after the conditions of 
power politics have changed
18. 
The wide spectrum of possible actions contains particular mechanisms of conflict resolution 
of its own, among them such of juridical interest, as forms of arbitration as sketched by So-
phie Lafont
19. An example for such a mechanism shows the letter AMRT 26/2, 468
20: In the 
context of negotiations connected to a conflict between Hammu-rapi of Babylon and Zimri-lim 
of Mari (which was later determined by Hammu-rapi by military means) we find at least the 
consideration of submitting to an arbitral verdict to be returned by other kings as “peers” 
(“brothers”)
21. Even if we cannot assume established institutions of legal or arbitral decision-
making and the episode has probably to be located in a rather vague political setting there 
seems to be some terminological and structural evidence of a juridical connotation. 
Treaties do therefore not stand for themselves, but are embedded in a procedural setting of 
political actions which are at least partially connected to legal forms of decision-making and 
conflict resolution. 
3. Legal character of treaties 
The procedural character of treaties as such does of course not answer the question of the 
legal character of these texts. The cardinal point is – as mentioned before – the legally bind-
                                                           
15 This seems particularly apparent when treaties contain historical introductions which report the preliminary 
events leading up to the conflict and the treaty; cf. Neumann, Bedeutung der hethitischen Staatsverträge, in: 
Lang/Barta/Rollinger (ed.), Staatsverträge (141-155) 147; elaborately Amnon Altman, The Role of the “Histori-
cal Prologue“ in the Hittite Vassal Treaties: An Early Experiment in Securing Treaty Compliance, Journal of the 
History of International Law 6, 2004, 43-64. 
16 For such a fundamental functioning as conflict resolution mechanism also Otto, Völkerrecht in der Antike, ZAR 
9, 2003 (201-209) 208. 
17 Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law, 18 f.; for the Old Babylonian period ibid. 
51-63. 
18 To this context belongs also the modification of treaties as a consequence of altered circumstances; cf. Altman, 
Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law, 121-123. 
19 Sophie Lafont, L’arbitrage en Mésopotamie, Revue de l‘arbitrage 4, 2000, 557-590. 
20 AMRT 26/2, 468, rev. 6’-9’: Remove Hit from the treaty tablet, and I shall commit myself! Then take the lead of 
the troops and get underway! After every single objective has been accomplished – afterwards, the kings, our 
brothers, must sit down. They must give us directions on the case (of the other cities) and I will heed the 
judgements they render; translat. Wolfgang Heimpel, Letters to the king of Mari, Winona Lake 2003, 379. 
21 Cf. also Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law, 79 f. 5 
 
ing force of the documented agreements. The juridical validity of those agreements is bound 
to the sanctions with which they are reinforced and which grant provision for breach of con-
tract. 
One more time it has to be mentioned that there are virtually no secularized sanctions, 
whereas mechanisms of protection of a treaty which are affected by metaphysical refer-
ences, such as oaths to the Gods, count among the standard repertoire of treaties. Amnon 
Altman has tried to explain the gap between the missing of secularized sanctions and the 
apparent importance of transcendent sanctions by a projection of earthly circumstances onto 
the divine sphere
22: Part of this projection is the idea that the outcome of war corresponds to 
decisions rendered by the gods – a conception which is of course not confined to the Ancient 
Near Eastern world, if one only thinks of the Homeric epic
23. The fact that the projection is 
arranged by the use of specific juridical language and forms, when e.g. the decision-making 
of the Gods is denominated as “judgment”, leaves an impression similar to the one we get 
when we look at daily legal life: Proper and just decision-making appears to be a universal 
principle, represented by the figure of the judge, and is to be found as well on the divine level 
of the cosmic order as in the context of the secularized authority of rulers who act as lawgiver 
and judge at the same time as on the level of an organized jurisdiction
24. 
But relating to the treaties two critical remarks have to be made: On one hand the actual 
forms of the projected concepts cannot be taken from the texts of the treaties themselves, 
but derive from the contextualization with other texts, e.g. royal inscriptions or letters
25. On 
the other hand it is remarkable that with regard to the treaties an organized jurisdiction never 
has been established, different from general legal life which shows the same correlation be-
tween the human and the divine sphere
26. However this phenomenon can easily be ex-
plained by the missing of a superior authority which could have determined the conflict – a 
problem we face even today in a globalizing world
27. 
The missing of an international judicial practice makes an answer to the question of a legally 
binding force of the treaties obviously difficult. A legally or differently binding force might 
therefore only be assumed as a general framework which is only indirectly documented. Evi-
dence for that can be found, when treaties allude to earlier agreements or oaths which are 
held no longer valid because of breach of contract. One example for that offers CTH 41.I.1, a 
treaty between Hatti and Kizzuwatna from the last third of the 15
th century BCE, in which a 
precedent agreement between Kizzuwatna and the Hurrians is declared as obsolete
28. This 
                                                           
22 See A. Altman, The Role of the “Historical Prologue“, Journal of the History of International Law 6, 2004( 43-64) 
43. 
23 For the formation of perspectives by the controversy about the historical nucleus of the Homeric epic see Neu-
mann, Bedeutung der hethitischen Staatsverträge, in: Lang/Barta/Rollinger (ed.), Staatsverträge (141-155) 
141f. 
24 Guido Pfeifer, Judicial Authority in backlit Perspective: Judges in the Old Babylonian Period, in: forum historiae 
iuris, August 2010, under http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/1103pfeifer.htm, fig. 11. 
25 For the Old Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian Period see Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of Inter-
national Law, 30-32. 
26 For forms of arbitration see Lafont, L’arbitrage en Mésopotamie, Revue de l‘arbitrage 4, 2000, 557-590. 
27 According to this, Altman’s subtle irony points a bunch of times to the analogy between the pantheon of the 
Ancient Near East and the United Nations, cf. Altman, The Role of the “Historical Prologue“, Journal of the His-
tory of International Law 6, 2004, 43-64, 50 with fn. 28, and id., Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of In-
ternational Law, 100. 
28 CTH 41.I.1: obv. 1 […] 
20 The Hurrian did not give up my vassals to (me) the Sun-King, but he sent his troops 
and 
21horses. 
22They plundered the land of Isuwa behind the back of the Sun-King. What they obtained as boo-
ty – cattle and sheep –, 
23they carried off [t]o the Hurrian-land. The Sun-King, took up position 
24[agai]nst the 
foe, for battle, at another place. 
25The Hurrians had transgressed the oath of the gods; transl. Kenneth A. Kitch-
en/Paul J. N. Lawrence, Treaty, Law and Covenant, Part 1: The Texts, Wiesbaden 2012, no. 51. 6 
 
refers at the same time to the question of the efficiency of treaties, but first we will turn to a 
short excursus on legislation by treaties. 
4. Excursus: Legislation by treaties 
Treaties do not only contain mechanisms of the settlement of conflicts between nations, such 
as disputes about territories and the like, but also normative orders which refer to daily legal 
life, such as sanctions for offenses etc. A simple example for that can be found in the sec-
tions 27 and 28 of the treaty between Ebla and Abarsal from the 24
th/23
rd century BCE
29. The 
linguistic structure of these legal rules is more or less identical with the structures of rules 
from the Old Mesopotamian law collections, even if those date a bit later. Apart from the al-
ready mentioned question of the actual function of the law collections (which cannot be dis-
cussed in this framework) it is apparent that treaties deserve attention in a context of norma-
tive or legislative genres as well. 
5. Efficiency of treaties 
According to the result of a missing international judicial practice the question of the efficien-
cy of treaties actually cannot be answered in a positive way. However, the example of gen-
eral legal rules as elements of treaties implies that the question itself might be problematic: In 
the context e.g. of sanctions for delicts evidence of enforcement of legal rules is also missing 
with regard to the law collections to a large extent. This is often explained by the recourse to 
legal custom
30. 
And another fact has to be mentioned: Although we find technical instruments to ensure effi-
ciency in private contracts and litigation documents from the earliest periods, such as waiving 
of actions
31 or penalties, there is nothing comparable within the treaties. As a result there is 
not much more than the mere assumption of a factual efficiency. In general the already men-
tioned procedural setting of treaties in a multitude of different mechanisms of conflict resolu-
tion and especially the fact that a treaty could also be seen as a mere transitional phase
32 
seem to advise to put the criteria of efficiency and the quality of legally binding force in prin-
ciple to the test – but that holds true for the past as well as for the present and the future. 
IV. Mechanisms of conflict resolution as content of treaties 
A similar picture can be drawn when turning to the contents of treaties which can be under-
stood as mechanisms of conflict resolution, but cannot be located on the level of a settlement 
of primary conflicts which gave reason to the treaty, but refer to secondary ones which are 
connected to those. 
                                                           
29 ARET XIII 43-76, rev. VII 8 - VIII 4: (§ 27) (In) the (festival) of the month (of) Isi, if an Eblaite lays (violent) hands 
on (and) kills an Arbasalite, (then) he shall pay a penalty of 50 rams. (§ 28) If an Arbasalite lays (violent) hands 
on (and) kills [an Eblaite], (then) he shall pay a penalty of 50 rams; transl. Kitchen/Lawrence, Treaty, Law and 
Covenant, Part 1, no. 2. 
30 For legal custom as a basis of normative texts see Guido Pfeifer, Gewohnheitsrecht oder Rechtsgewohn-
heit(en) in altbabylonischer Zeit oder Was war die Grundlage des „Codex“ Ḫammurabi?, ZAR 18, 2012, 127-
132. 
31 Cf. Guido Pfeifer, Klageverzichtsklauseln in altbabylonischen Vertrags- und Prozessurkunden als Instrumenta-
rien der Konfliktvermeidung bzw. Konfliktlösung, in: Robert Rollinger/ Martin Lang/Heinz Barta (ed.), Prozeß-
recht und Eid: Recht und Rechtsfindung in antiken Kulturen, Teil I (in print). 
32 See above fn. 18. 7 
 
Among them count regulations on prisoners of war or the interstate extradition of certain per-
sons as shown in sections 1-3 of the already cited treaty between Ebla and Abarsal
33. The 
validity (or efficiency) of such regulations is indirectly proved by rules such as section 27 LH
34 
which can be interpreted as a kind of an Old Babylonian ius postliminii. 
V. Résumé 
Treaties represent on one hand a singular phenomenon in the tradition of cuneiform laws 
which differs considerably from the other genres of legal literature, especially with regard to 
sanctions and their practice which are provided (or not provided) in these texts. On the other 
hand the consideration of treaties as one form in a multitude of mechanisms of conflict reso-
lution and their embedment into a procedural setting show that the impression of a singular 
character has to be modified with a view to their functionality. The inherent element of “ordi-
nary” legislation puts treaties in the neighborhood of law collections and the questions con-
nected with these. The criteria for efficiency might have to be generally put into question. 
Altogether the number of questions prevail the number of answers. But perhaps the juridical 
evaluation of treaties is not so much about avoiding a terminological, but a theoretical anach-
ronism which implies false conclusions: Just because we do not find all criteria of validity and 
efficiency we expect from legal texts, it does not imply that validity and efficiency were not 
established by other means. What remains is the task and challenge of an adequate charac-
terization. 
                                                           
33 ARET XIII 43-76, obv. VI 6-VII 12: (§ 1) Whoever: curses the Ruler, and curses the God(s), and curses the 
Land, he shall die! (§ 2) (Thus), if the man responsible (is) from A[barsal] Ebla shall hand him over; (and) if the 
man responsible (is) from A[barsal], A[barsal shall execute him]. (§ 3) If [the man responsible (is) from Ebla], 
(then) A[barsal] shall hand him over; (and) if the man responsible (is) from Ebla, Ebla shall execute him; transl. 
Kitchen/Lawrence, Treaty, Law and Covenant, Part 1, no. 2. 
34 KH X 13-29 (LH sec. 27): If there is either a soldier or a fisherman who is taken captive while serving in a royal 
fortress, and they give his field and his orchard to another to succeed to his holdings, and he then performs his 
service obligation – if he (the soldier or fisherman) should return and get back to his city, they shall return to him 
his field and orchard and he himself shall perform his service obligation; transl. Martha T. Roth, Law Collections 
from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2
nd ed. Atlanta 1997, 86. 